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Abstract—In the past years, industrial networks have become
increasingly interconnected and opened to private or public
networks. This leads to an increase in efficiency and manage-
ability, but also increases the attack surface. Industrial networks
often consist of legacy systems that have not been designed with
security in mind. In the last decade, an increase in attacks on
cyber-physical systems was observed, with drastic consequences
on the physical work. In this work, attack vectors on industrial
networks are categorised. A real-world process is simulated,
attacks are then introduced. Finally, two machine learning-based
methods for time series anomaly detection are employed to detect
the attacks. Matrix Profiles are employed more successfully than
a predictor Long Short-Term Memory network, a class of neural
networks.
Index Terms—Cyber Security, Time Series, Machine Learning,
Neural Networks, Industrial Control Systems
I. INTRODUCTION
For decades, the industrial domain has been deemed secure
due to two reasons: First, the physical separation of networks.
Second, each network was created in an application specific
fashion, rendering it extremely difficult for an attacker to
exploit it [1]. However, the fourth industrial revolution in-
troduced novel use cases that build on interconnectivity and
embedded intelligence [2], [3]. While increasing productivity
and flexibility and decreasing operational cost and effort, new
attack vectors are introduced to industrial systems as well.
An increase in attacks on industrial environments can be de-
tected [4]. While industrial networks have been unique in their
applications specific nature, the establishment of Commercial
Off The Shelf (COTS) hard- and software introduces stan-
dardised modules. This makes set up and maintenance much
easier, but also drastically increases the effect of vulnerabilities
in one of the modules. In order to tackle these problems, cyber
security measures have been adapted to industrial scenarios,
such as firewalls, anti virus software and intrusion detection
tools. However, the characteristics of industrial networks differ
from those of home and office networks, motivating the
need for adaption of those tools. A deep understanding of
these characteristics is required in order to effectively protect
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industrial networks. In this work, an overview of possible
attacks for industrial networks is provided. Attack vectors
are analysed and categorised, with an emphasis on industrial
network protocols. Furthermore, the simulation of a real-world
scenario is presented, as well as attacks on this scenario. The
remainder of this work is structured as follows: In Section II,
related work is presented. A systematic categorisation of attack
scenarios is provided in Section III. The simulated process and
the implementation of attacks is described in Section IV and
evaluated in Section V. Finally, the findings are discussed in
Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, related work on classification of industrial
cyber attacks is presented. Furthermore, it is grouped with
respect to the scope that is addressed by the work in Table I.
Cherdantseva et al. survey existing risk assessment methods
and evaluate their usefulnes with respect to Supervisory Con-
trol And Data Acquisition (SCADA) scenarios [5]. Gao and
Morris discuss the detection of cyber attacks [6]. They focus
on signature-based detection for Modbus-based communica-
tion. In order to evaluate the intrusion detection and to classify
it, possible attacks are grouped. A more thorough analysis of
attacks on Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) is performed by
Morris and Gao as well [7]. Zhu et al. provide an overview
of cyber attacks while considering many dimensions [8].
They compare industrial cyber security to classic IT security.
Furthermore, they consider the security objectives of industrial
applications and ways they can be attacked. Finally, they
present specific attacks on different attack surfaces of an
industrial environment. In another work, Zhu and Sastry create
a taxonomy for SCADA-specific attacks [9]. They present
types of attacks and discuss countermeasures. Fernandez et
al. discuss the development of secure SCADA systems [10].
In doing so, attacks on industrial systems are evaluated with
respect to their attack vector. Fovino et al. discuss the effects
of SCADA attacks on infrastructure [11]. They first assess
the potential damages to eventually discuss potential attack
types. Ten et al. present a vulnerability assessment of SCADA
systems [12]. They consider the increasing dependency of in-
dustrial and office Information Technology (IT). Furthermore,
they classify attacks according to their type to model and
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evaluate attack scenarios in using attack trees in an earlier
work [13]. Cai et al. analyse the development of SCADA
systems, their applications and threats [14]. Furthermore, they
discuss standards and guidelines for protecting such systems.
Igure et al. discuss SCADA security [1]. They analyse attacks,
categorise them and extract research challenges. Furthermore,
standardisation efforts are addressed. The summary of ad-
dressed topics is shown in Table I.
TABLE I
RESEARCH TOPICS COVERED BY THE INDIVIDUAL WORKS
Subject Covered Research Work
Risk Assessment [5], [11]–[13]
Industrial vs Home- and Office IT [8]
Attack Vectors [10]
Security Objectives [1], [8]
Types of Attacks [1], [6]–[9], [11]–[13]
Standards and Guidelines [14]
Applications in SCADA [14]
Taxonomy [1], [9]
Intrusion Detection [6], [9]
Most research is done regarding the types of attacks, i.e.
the way an attacker will influence the systems or networks.
Risk assessment is a widely regarded topic as well. In risk
assessment, the effects of an attack are discussed in a formal
manner. The remaining topics are more specific and only
addressed by one or two singular works.
III. INDUSTRIAL ATTACKS
In this section, possible ways for an attacker to break
into industrial applications are discussed. This is done by
looking at past attacks on industrial networks that have
extensively been discussed. Stuxnet, the attack that came
to attention first, has been widely discussed [15]–[18], but
also the lesser known successors, such as Duqu [17], Indus-
troyer/Crashoverride [15], [19], Flame [17], BlackEnergy [15],
[19], Havex [15] and Red October [17] have received attention.
An assessment of attack vectors for industrial companies is
done by Positive Technologies [20]. They evaluate points of en-
try and propagation methods in a general fashion which, how-
ever, is in accordance to the above-mentioned malware-specific
analyses. The first step in attacking industrial environments
is commonly the breach of the perimeter. Even though there
are occasions where industrial networks are directly connected
to the Internet [4], they are commonly separated from public
networks. This is an important recommendation in securing
industrial networks [20], especially since many industrial
network protocols do not contain means for authentication or
encryption. This allows easy propagation and participation in
communication for an attacker once the network is accessible.
If the production network is not reachable from the outside,
the corporate network needs to be breached first. According
to Positive Technologies, 73% of the corporate systems they
tested had insufficient protection of their perimeter [20].
Another common attack vector is the human user. Allegedly
the Stuxnet attack has breached the perimeter by means of a
thumb drive that was carelessly used [18]. After breaking the
perimeter, the ICS or the field devices respectively have to
be taken over. The analysed malware that was tailor-made for
industrial targets used properties or vulnerabilities characteris-
tic to the industrial environment they were designed for. Some
malware could stay undetected for long periods of time, at least
partly due to missing or insufficient security procedures for
industrial networks. Implementing robust security for critical
parts of production networks is one of the major take aways.
Most industrial malware consists of several modules:
• Backdoor,
• loader module, and
• wiper module
The backdoor allows for communication with Command &
Control (C&C) servers. Coupled to the backdoor is the loader
module that is tasked with uploading the malware modules to
perform certain attacks. And lastly, most industrial malware
contains a module for wiping the traces of its existence from
the infected system. Breaking the perimeter has proven to be
possible most of the time. The difficulty of industrial malware
lies in the profound knowledge the malware authors needs to
have about the targeted systems. This goes for the architecture
of the infrastructure as well as for the protocols and devices
used. Most devices used in industrial applications are COTS
products and can thus be obtained for vulnerability analysis,
so that exploits can be written and re-used. However, to
successfully break a process by abusing system parameters, the
intent of devices as well as the structure of the process needs to
be known. These attacks are hardest to detect, as the attacker
can conceal them as irregularities or normal behaviour. The
attacks that are implemented and evaluated in this work are
such attacks. They are based on the assumption of a suc-
cessful breach of perimeter and take over of a Programmable
Logic Controller (PLC) which subsequently shows malicious
behaviour.
In summary, any attack of an industrial application first needs
to break the perimeter. Then it needs to move laterally towards
the control system or target device. Finally, the malicious
intent has to be carried out. During each of these steps, the
attack can be discovered by different means. Breaking the
perimeter should be observed by IT-based security means.
Lateral movement is in the domain of siem! (siem!)-systems.
Detecting attacks in the context of an industrial process is the
final method to discover misbehaviour.
IV. PROCESS ENVIRONMENT AND ATTACK SCENARIOS
In this section, the process under investigation as well as
the implemented attacks are discussed. First, the real-world
process is described and transferred to a simulation. After that,
the attack scenarios and their implementations are presented.
A. Process Environment
The process this work is based upon has been used to
generate data for industrial intrusion detection already [21].
It is shown in Figure 1. The process environment consists of
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Fig. 1. Schematic Overview of the Process Environment
two water containers, Container 1 and Container 2. Water is
pumped with pump P101, driven by a DC motor M101 from
Container 1 to Container 2 until a threshold is reached. The
water level is measured with different sensors, S111 and S112,
as well as capacitive sensors B113 and B114. Additionally, A
vane sensor measuring the flow of liquid between Container
1 and Container 2, B102, and a PT100 temperature sensor,
B104, are used. To release water from Container 2, a solenoid
valve, M102, is employed. An exemplary behaviour of this
process is shown as a time-series in Figure 2. A selection
of process parameters, all of them sensor outputs, during
normal operation is shown. This operation has been performed
on real implementation of the scenario that was used to
create the simulation analysed in this work. For this work,
the environment described above has been extended to five
instances. They are simulated with real-world hardware, i.e.
Siemens S7-1500 PLCs and PiXtend extension boards for
Raspberry Pis. Five Raspberry Pis with a PiXtend-board each
are used to simulate the process, controlled by a PLC each.
The process information is collected on a central Human
Machine Interface (HMI). In order to obtain realistic data,
the simulation has been developed to mimic the real scenario
as good as possible. For communication, OPC UA [22] is
used. It provides encrypted, authenticated, easy and platform-
independent communication and consists of an information
model including communication capabilities. In this scenario,
a master-slave concept is followed with regular polling of the
devices by the HMI.
B. Attack Scenarios
Two scenarios have been implemented and evaluated in this
work. They are loosely coupled to the categorisation of Morris
and Gao [7]. In this work, all attacks are a kind of Response
and Measurement Injection Attack. In creating the data set for
evaluation, one of the five PLCs shows malicious behaviour
for five minutes after 15 minutes of normal operation for
each attack. The use case is an attacker having breached
the perimeter, bridged the air gap and used well-engineered
malicious code to disrupt the process. The aim of this scenario
is to detect malicious behaviour on field level. This area is
currently not well-developed, intrusion detection on field level
is a growing field with a short history. The behaviour regarding
flow and water level of Container 1 of the malicious process
is shown in Figure 3. Since a specific application use case
is discussed in this work, the attacks are domain-specific.
However, as discussed in Section III, the general concept of
this kind of attack can be generalised to most processing units.
1) Open Valve Attack: In the first attack scenario, the valve
M102 is opened even though water is pumped from Container
1 to Container 2. This leads to an increased time it takes for
Container 2 to be filled up to the desired level. The HMI
indicates the valve as open. This attack starts at packet 4,200
and ends around packet 4,800 in Figure 3. As in the process,
the valve is not supposed to be opened, this is an identifier
of the attack, making it trivial to detect. In order to better
evaluate the methods presented in this work, it is not used as
an input variable.
2) Stealth Attack: The second attack scenario is imple-
mented in a stealthier fashion. As in attack scenario 1, the
valve is opened invalidly. However, the sensor still indicates
a closed valve. This leads to an unexpected decrease in filling
speed of Container 2 and an increased emptying once the
container is filled. This attack starts at packet 6,500 and ends
at the end of the trace in Figure 3.
V. EVALUATION
In this section, the methods to detect the discussed attacks
are presented and evaluated on the data set. As input values
for the anomaly detection, the water flow as well as the water
level of Container 1 are used. They could easily be extended,
but proved to be the most expressive variables.
A. Matrix Profiles
Time series-based anomaly detection has proved to be
highly effective in industrial intrusion detection [23]. As the
process is expected to produce regular sensors and actuator
values, deviations of a time series representation of those
values should be detectable. In this work, Matrix Profiles are
used to analyse the data sets. Matrix Profiles were introduced
by Yeh et al. in 2016 and provide a mean to determine the
similarity of sequences in a time series to other sequences [24].
In order to employ Matrix Profiles, only one hyper-parameter
needs to be set, the window sizem. It is robust against changes
and provides sensible results for a variety of lengths. However,
each time window needs to contain a set of values that has a
standard deviation that is not zero. Thus,m needs to be chosen
in a way that no window in the water flow values only contains
zero flow, as shown in Figure 4. In this figure, the water
flow, as well as the water level of Container 1, are shown in
combination with their respective Matrix Profiles. The Matrix
Profile determines the minimal distance of any windowed
sequence of length m from any other sequence of length
m. In terms of anomaly detection, a high minimal distance
represents an outlier, as the corresponding window does not
look like any other. In Figure 4, the normal behaviour of the
process is shown, with m as 300. Even though m proved to be
robust in the evaluation, auto-correlation [25] was employed in
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Fig. 2. Normal Process Behaviour
order to find a sensible value. The auto-correlation function of
the normal process is shown in Figure 5. The peak at around
150 seconds indicated periodic behaviour. In our experiments,
two measurements per second were performed, thus a window
size of 300 packets was chosen as m. In Figure 4, the Matrix
Profiles, named Min. Dist., are small, except for the beginning.
The settling of the process is a unique event, thus the high
minimal distance. The process was monitored on one of the
PLCs that did not exhibit malicious behaviour. This was
introduced to another PLC and resulted in the behaviour shown
in Figure 6. Both attacks show significant peaks in the minimal
distances around both attacks as described in Subsection IV-B.
It is noteworthy that the transitions from normal to malicious
behaviour, and vice versa, are the events in the time series that
are unique and thus result in an increased minimal distance. If
an attack has a characteristic signature that is repeated more
than once, it is not detected as an anomaly anymore, as another
instance with the same characteristic is found. To counter this
effect, Matrix Profiles can be adapted in a way that they are
employed continuously. This shows promising results [23].
This approach indicates any change in behaviour. To mitigate
disruptions due to alerts, natural changes in processes can
be integrated into Matrix Profiles with an extension [26].
Furthermore, Matrix Profiles can be used to analyse meta data,
providing good results as well [23].
B. Long Short-Term Memory
Many types of Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) tend
to neglect long-term dependencies in the decision making. In
order to keep such information, Hochreiter and Schmidhuber
proposed a novel kind of RNNs in 1997 to overcome the
vanishing gradient problem [27]. This kind of RNN is called
Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM). In this work, an LSTM
with an input layer consisting of 350 units, two hidden layers
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Fig. 3. Malicious Process Behaviour
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Fig. 4. Time Series and Matrix Profiles of Normal Behaviour
with 350 and 250 units respectively and a dense output-layer
is employed. The input length is 300 as this is the minimal
periodicity of the data. The learning rate was set to 0.001. An
hour of process activity was used to train it in 25 iterations.
No attacks were contained in the data. After that, the hour of
process activity conducted by the infected PLC was used as
the testing data set. In order to monitor anomalousness, a value
was predicted by the neural network and compared to the real
value. The distance between those values was calculated, a
high value indicating an anomalous instance. The result of the
LSTM is shown in Figure 7. The first row shows the real values
of water flow, the second row the predicted values and the third
row the absolute error. The fourth row shows the real values
of the water Container 1, the second row the predicted values
and the third row the absolute error. It can be seen that the
LSTM closely follows the process behaviour. Unfortunately,
this also includes the attacks. They are predicted as part of the
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Fig. 5. Auto-correlation of Normal Time Series
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Fig. 6. Time Series and Matrix Profiles of Malicious Behaviour
process by the LSTM, making detection of the attacks difficult.
Only the frequency of the periodic error behaviour changes,
however, values that clearly indicate attacks would enhance
the detection probability.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this work, we discussed the attack scenarios in indus-
trial environments. From these scenarios, a use case was
derived and implemented. After that, attack scenarios where
introduced to the scenario. Two time series-based anomaly
detection methods were employed to detect the attacks. Matrix
Profiles performed satisfactorily, detecting the attacks easily.
Only one robust hyper-parameter and no supervised training
make it easy to use and transfer between application domains.
The LSTM approach did not work well, it predicted the attack
behaviour as well as the normal behaviour. This behaviour can
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Fig. 7. Time Series, Predictions and Errors Based on LSTMs
derive from over-fitting, as regular time series have a tendency
to teach neural networks to learn certain patterns, but not to
generalise. Context information [28] or methods of machine
learning-based classification [29] might address the issue as
well.
A. An Epilogue on Sophisticated Industrial Attacks
One of the major features of sophisticated industrial attacks
such as Stuxnet is the masquerading of any indicators for
misbehaviour. However, if no trace of malicious behaviour is
simulated, it simply cannot be detected. For the sake of clarity
in this work, only attacks with distinctive characteristics were
used, so that detection was possible. After attacks such as
Stuxnet propagated into the industrial domain, side-channel
detection, e.g. acoustic signals, would be required if standard
field busses were used. Langner claims that any engineer
with experience in the area would have told something was
amiss easily by the sound of the turbines. Unfortunately, such
side-channels are hard to simulate. However, there are works
creating data sets of real-world applications including side-
channel sensor measurements so that they can be used to detect
attacks [21].
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